The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the future of political Islam and the ‘War on Terror’ by Kepel, Giles
  
Giles Kepel 
The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the 








Kepel, Giles (2009) The Middle East: intractable conflict?: the future of political Islam and the 
‘War on Terror’. IDEAS reports - strategic updates, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SU003. LSE IDEAS, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43640/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2009 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 




4The Future of Political Islam and the 
‘War on Terror’
B
y the end of 2001, an e-book by Dr Ayman al-
Zawahiri, the famous Egyptian MD and the paramount 
ideologue of Al Qaeda, entitled Knights under the 
Prophet’s Banner, was circulated online.  It explained the 
rationale for 9/11: a substitute for the radical Islamists’ failure to 
mobilise the masses in the guerrilla Jihads in Egypt, in Algeria, 
in Bosnia, in Cashmere, and in Chechnya in the 1990s, where 
they had tried to duplicate the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s.  
That failure induced Al Qaeda to change strategy, to focus on 
the ‘faraway enemy’ and not the near enemy. The latter was 
impersonated by the so-called Apostate rulers, the lackeys of the West, the ‘Pharaohs’, the 
Mubaraks of this world.  It had proved difficult to mobilise the masses against them, since 
their “apostasy” was not obvious – on the surface they still looked like Muslims, bore Muslim 
names, and had scores of religious scholars to legitimise them.  Mobilising against the impious 
Americans looked far clearer from an ideological point of view, particularly if they were likened 
to the Israelis with whom they were allied: striking at the United States was a means to fight a 
“legitimate” and crystal-clear Jihad, and to expose America as a giant with clay feet.  Hitting 
New York and Washington was also a means of reviving by proxy Islamist confidence in their 
struggle against their apostate rulers at home.
Tactically, suicide operations — a relatively new mode of action in the region — became 
the key to carrying out this reorientated Jihad. In 1980, after Saddam Hussein had attacked 
Iran, the young Islamic Republic resisted the Iraqi offensive by sending a huge number of 
brainwashed young men into the Iraqi minefields to ‘clear a path’ for the regular troops. 
These bassidji were sent to their death with a headband on their forehead that read ‘there 
is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His prophet’ and they would be treated as martyrs. 
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5This tactic of martyrdom through suicide 
was transported into the Arab world by the 
Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah, in the 
form of explosive belts which they detonated 
against the Israeli, French and American 
troops that were deployed in Lebanon after 
1982, forcing the French and the Americans 
to pull out and the Israelis to retreat to a 
smaller portion of the territory in the far 
south of Lebanon. This success was all the 
more impressive since up to that point Arabs 
had never achieved a military victory against 
Israel. Suddenly there were means that 
proved efficient against the terrible might 
of the Israel Defence Forces, and the tactic 
began to spread in the early 1990s, leading 
to “martyrdom operations” — or suicide 
attacks, as they were seen from the other 
side — inside Israel itself. The first significant 
waves of such operations took place in 1996 
in retaliation for the machine-gunning of 
Muslim worshippers in a Hebron mosque by 
an Israeli settler.
The operations sparked fierce debate among 
Sunni clerics. Was this new tactic martyrdom 
or suicide? If it was martyrdom it could be 
labelled as jihad, and its perpetrators would 
go to paradise; if it was suicide they would 
roast in hell. The majority of Saudi-Wahhabi 
scholars ruled it was suicide, because they 
feared it constituted a very dangerous 
precedent that threatened Saudi dominance 
as the main ideologues of conservative Sunni 
Islamism worldwide, and gave credit to 
radical tactics they could not control. On the 
other side was Sheikh Qaradawi, a prominent 
Qatar-based Egyptian member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and a popular figure on the 
Al Jazeera TV talk-show ‘Shari’a and Life’.  
Qaradawi explained that under conditions of 
particular duress — such as Israeli occupation 
— such attacks were martyrdom operations, 
reinforcing his argument on the basis that 
because every Israeli including women did 
military service they were all combatants, 
even though they were temporarily in civilian 
clothes, and so suicide attacks against Israeli 
civilians were a legitimate means of Jihad in 
the path of Allah. 
1996 was not only the year of the first set 
of Sunni suicide operations, it was also the 
year when Al Jazeera went on air. Without 
Al Jazeera there could be no Al Qaeda, 
because such operations could only become 
instruments for mobilisation if they were 
broadcasted favourably by a non-Western 
satellite TV channel. 1996 was also the year 
of Osama Bin Laden’s first declaration of 
6Jihad against the Americans that occupied the Land of the two Holy Places (i.e. Saudi Arabia). 
So 1996 was a watershed year, because radical Islamist movements would start to abandon 
failing guerrilla Jihad against the nearby enemy — using in its stead martyrdom tactics against 
the faraway enemy — be it first Israeli and later American.
Martyrdom operations became the 
tremendously popular signature of the 
second Intifada, prompting telethons in Saudi 
Arabia and other countries to raise money for 
the martyrs’ families — sidelining the ulema’s 
cautious rulings .  This ‘grand narrative’ of 
Jihad through martyrdom was claimed by 
Islamist radicals as their core strategy to 
mobilize the masses. It would lead to 9/11, 
but it did not succeed in galvanising broader 
Muslim opinion and the copycat operations from Bali to Tunis, from Casablanca to Madrid, 
and ultimately to London with the 7/7 bombings did not lead to a mass Muslim mobilisation 
under Bin Laden’s banner. The Iraq invasion of 2003, though, was regarded by Al Qaeda as 
a golden opportunity because, just like in Afghanistan in the 1980s, impious crusader armies 
had invaded the abode of Islam. Zawahiri therefore portrayed Jihad to defend that sacred 
territory as a compulsory defensive Jihad for all Muslims worldwide. They expected to reap the 
fruits of that call and establish an ‘Islamic emirate’ in Iraq, from where they would conquer the 
Middle East and the world. But the Afghan Jihad had been financed, trained and equipped 
by the United States through  the CIA, and the Gulf countries, whereas this Jihad, although 
in receipt of some private Gulf money, lacked comparable means. As a result, Al Qaeda had 
only minimal success in recruiting foreigners to go to fight Jihad in Iraq and moreover, when 
fighters from Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Karachi, Cairo or Algiers came to Baghdad to 
fight, their martyrdom was hijacked by local Sunnis for their own vested interest. Instead of 
killing Americans, they were sent to kill other Muslims, the Shiites who were deemed to be 
the stooges and beneficiaries of US occupation. As a result, the average Muslim worldwide 
Sheik Qaradawi was influential in 
justifying the use of martyrdom operations.
7who was not concerned with sectarian strife 
between Sunnis and Shiites finally turned 
against Al Qaeda:  instead of being the 
embodiment of global Jihad, the Iraqi mass 
slaughter exemplified Fitna - the internal 
strife that brings havoc into Muslim society 
and makes it an easy prey for its enemies. 
That brought to an end the grand narrative 
of Jihad through martyrdom’s tentative 
appeal on the Muslim masses.
On the other hand, right after 9/11, George 
W. Bush and his neoconservative advisors 
produced a parallel grand narrative, that of 
the war of terror, which used the opportunity 
of 9/11 to push their own agenda: to remake 
the Middle East.  The invasion of Iraq — 
unrelated as a matter of fact to 9/11 and 
justified by the ‘sexed-up’ fable of Saddam’s 
WMDs —  was aimed at bringing about 
a friendly, pro-Western, Iraq, that would 
undermine Arab opposition to the West 
and to the Jewish state. It could also pump 
some non-OPEC Iraqi oil on the market and 
undermine the swing producer position that 
the Saudi kingdom had attained.  This had 
the useful corollary effect of punishing the 
real culprit for 9/11: 15 of the 19 hijackers 
were Saudis and had been brainwashed 
by the wahhabi curriculum. Moreover, the 
invasion would promote democracy in 
the whole region, which was all the more 
important as terrorism surged, so the analysis 
of the neocons went, because there existed 
no outlet for pluralism in a Middle East 
dominated by authoritarian regimes, and so 
people were forced to resort to arms if they 
wanted to express their dissidence. 
But the premise on which this democracy 
narrative would be based happened to be 
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, two symbols 
of arbitrary confinement and torture that ran 
counter to the rule of law so cherished by the 
American people. Muslim civil society, which 
was the original target of the democracy 
narrative, soon turned its back on it, as 
did European public opinion, even in such 
countries as Spain and Britain (both hit by 
suicide attacks) where governments had sent 
troops to Iraq. Finally US electors followed 
suit, voting out the Republicans in 2006 and 
2008 and electing Barack Obama, an early 
opponent to the war in Iraq, whose first 
decision was to close down Guantanamo 
(even though implementing that policy was a 
more difficult matter). 
“both grand narratives 
failed in one place, Iraq”
8So both grand narratives failed in one 
place, Iraq. Ironically, as their exponents 
were destroying each other, their common 
nemesis, Iran, a terrorist state for Washington 
and a heretic Shiite state for Sunni radicals 
and conservatives alike, became kingmaker 
— both in Iraq and in the region. 
 
Obama’s priority was an orderly pullout 
from Iraq, and that meant an agreement 
of some kind with Tehran, whose influence 
on Iraqi Shiite militias was to be taken in 
consideration. That was the rationale for 
the new American president’s open hand 
policy towards Iran, together with politics 
of appeasement with the Muslim world, as 
exemplified by his Cairo university speech. 
His second priority was to refocus the war 
against the core terrorists, away from Iraq 
and onto the “AfPak” region, where Bin 
Laden and his last jihadists were probably 
located and hidden, courtesy of the local 
Taleban. Finally, Obama exerted some level 
of rhetorical pressure on Israel to stop the 
extension of settlements in the West bank. 
None of those three initiatives met with the 
success the White House had expected. The 
re-election of president Ahmadinejad meant 
that the Iranian regime was not in the mood 
to seek any compromise with the West — 
on such issues as its nuclear program or its 
support for Hezballah in Lebanon — even 
though the election showed some amount 
of popular opposition to the regime, and, 
more important, a fault line within the 
regime itself between the clergy and the 
Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards. The 
war in Afghanistan proved more and more 
unpopular in NATO countries, as the number 
of dead increased, while the difficulties 
of Karzai’s re-election, which came with 
accusations of fraud and corruption against 
his administration, didn’t help. The war 
against Al Qaeda had to be waged first and 
foremost against the Taleban, a grassroots 
movement in the Pashtun regions, which 
proved very difficult to fight and led to a 
number of unpopular civilian casualties. 
Finally, there was no progress on the Arab-
Israeli peace process, quite the contrary. 
The IDF assault on the Gaza strip and the 
uncompromising stance of the Israeli coalition 
government – depending on the Israel 
Baytuna Party headed by Avigdor Lieberman 
– prevented meanigful progress, as did the 
fragmentation of Palestinian representation 
between the Hamas controlled Gaza strip 
and the Fatah controlled West Bank.
